Analysis: The Cubs Replace Kyle Schwarber With...Basically Kyle Schwarber

A few days ago, we learned some major free agency news involving the Dodgers - a move that instantly improves this player’s new ballclub and could potentially impact the outcome of his new division. Of course, I am referring to Joc Pederson’s decision to leave LA and sign a one-year contract with the Chicago Cubs.

At first glance, this move makes a ton of sense for Chicago. After all, the only thing worse than their rotation depth right now is their outfield depth. Currently, they only have two full-time outfielders on their Major League roster, and none of their top outfield prospects have even made it out of A ball. In other words, they were in desperate need of a veteran outfielder who can play every day alongside Jason Heyward and Ian Happ. 

However, the more you look into this move, the more confusing it starts to become, and this has a lot to do with the man Pederson is replacing: Kyle Schwarber. 

Let’s start with the Cubs’ decision to get rid of Schwarber in the first place. To say Schwarber’s career in Chicago began with a bang would be an understatement. After all, he was the fourth overall pick in 2014, made the big league roster a year later, and then became a World Series legend in 2016. As far as MLB careers go, you can’t ask for a much better start. And while he hasn’t been the game-changing player that many expected him to be after those first few seasons, he has proven himself to be a reliable part of the Cubs lineup who can play every day, produce on offense, and net you roughly 3 WAR every season. Furthermore, he was a fan favorite who established himself as one of the core players on the Cubs roster.

Unfortunately, like many of us, Schwarber was hit hard by 2020. His slashline, which typically sat around .240/.340/.500 plummeted down to .188/.308/.393. That .188 mark wasn’t just the worst batting average of his career, it was the worst among all qualified hitters. And this slump could not have come at a worse time for him. Between his disappointing numbers on the field, ownership’s desire to shed as much payroll as possible, and the front office’s desire to break up the team’s current core, Schwarber found himself as the odd man out at the end of the season. As a result, Schwarber was non-tendered by Chicago in early December. 

Looking deeper into the numbers, however, that decision becomes pretty questionable. Well, making any hasty decision based on a 60-game sample is questionable (for example, giving a pitcher a contract worth over $40 million per year), but in this case it's especially dubious. Sure, his “traditional” stats weren’t up to snuff, but according to Statcast, his offensive vitals were alive and well in 2020. His exit velocity (92.8 MPH) was not only above his career average (91.8), but it was in the 95th percentile of hitters in 2020. Additionally, his hard hit rate of 47.2% was on par for him (career average 46.0%) and well above average for MLB (86th percentile). These factors, alongside a very high walk and barrel rate (83rd and 75th percentile, respectively), tell a very different story of Schwarber’s season. 

In other words, Schwarber wasn’t necessarily awful in 2020. In fact, in many ways he was the same player as before. But unfortunately for him, he was just incredibly unlucky. Not only did he have a very poorly-timed September slump that drove down his numbers for the season, but he also had luck bringing him down when he was playing well. To illustrate this, we only need to look at his 2020 BABIP. Prior to last season, Schwarber’s BABIP typically sat between .275 and .300, which makes sense given his hitting style and how hard he typically hits the ball. But while his batted balls had the same characteristics as before, he was now suddenly dealing with a BABIP of just .219. To put it simply, even though he was hitting the ball extremely hard, he wasn’t hitting ‘em where they ain’t. 

This run of bad luck would be unsustainable over a full season, which is why we see a much higher BABIP in 2017, 2018, and 2019. But in a season with just 60 games, one extended stretch of bad luck can break your season. Thus, even though he had one year of arbitration left and there really wasn’t much of a reason to be worried about his performance, Schwarber’s luck ultimately left him out of a job.

This brings us to his replacement in left field. As I mentioned previously, signing Pederson was not a bad move by any means. In fact, adding him to the lineup would provide an instant improvement for almost any team in the league. But what makes this move so confusing to me is the fact that Pederson and Schwarber are basically the exact same player.

The resemblance is pretty uncanny. First and foremost, they are both the same type of player: a bat-first, field-last left fielder who showcases tremendous power from the left-hand batter’s box but does not hit for average or handle left-handed pitchers very well. Additionally, they both are roughly the same age (Schwarber is 27, Pederson is 28), have spent about the same time in the league (Schwarber is just below the 6 year threshold, Pederson is just above), and have similar builds (6’0”, 235 and 6’1”, 220). But where this comparison really gets odd is when we get down to the numbers.

Let’s start with the “traditional” stats. For his career, Schwarber is a .230/.336/.480 hitter, while Pederson has slashed .230/.336/.470. And when you take into account their home run (121, 130), RBI (279, 303), walk (274, 304) and strikeout totals (591, 609), you get an eerily similar player profile. The comparisons don’t stop with the simple stats either. For example, they also have nearly identical entries for career wOBA (.343, .344), wRC+ (113, 118), ISO (.249, .240), exit velocity (91.8, 91.3), launch angle (14.7, 14.2), and BABIP (.267, .257) to name a few. Plus, not only are their line drive, ground ball, and fly ball rates basically the same (17.8%/41.1%/41.1% compared to 17.7%/41.9%/40.4%), but their distribution was comparable as well: Schwarber pulls 43.8% of his batted balls, while Pederson pulls 44.9%.

Funnily enough, they also had equally unlucky 2020 seasons. Both had career-low slashlines (.188/.308/.393 for Schwarber, .190/.285/.397 for Pederson) while simultaneously putting up above-average exit velocity, barrel rates, xwOBA, and hard hit rates that were made irrelevant by insanely low BABIP.

To be frank, the only real difference between the two is that Schwarber has a higher walk, strikeout, and hard hit rate, while Pederson has more games, PA, and WAR under his belt. Additionally, Schwarber is a bit faster and Pederson is (only slightly) better on defense. However, I wouldn’t say that any of these are major differentiators. Which brings me to my main question here: why would the Cubs get rid of Schwarber only to replace him with essentially the exact same player? 

One could argue that this move was about cutting payroll. However, if this was the case, they would have gotten a much cheaper player instead. Both players are scheduled to make $7 million in 2021, so the argument that they couldn’t have paid Schwarber makes no logical sense.

Others might argue that this has more to do with his rough 2020 season, but this also defies logic. After all, Pederson put up basically the same numbers and had the same struggles as Schwarber last year. If the Cubs were scared away by Schwarber’s 2020, then they probably would have stayed far away from Pederson. Besides, their front office is smart enough to know that his troubles were largely surface level, so I doubt that Schwarber’s numbers had a lot to do with this situation.

The most likely scenario here is that Schwarber’s dismissal is more of a message than anything -  a concrete symbol to match the front office’s messaging about how they are “coming to the end of this group of players.” However, even in this light, it seems like a strange move. After all, Schwarber was still under team control for one more season. Why not wait and see if he returns to form and then trade him for some decent prospects at the deadline? By simply non-tendering him, the Cubs get nothing in return at a time when they should be focused on rebuilding their farm system. 

In conclusion, this is a head-scratching set of moves for Cubs. They saved no money on their payroll, they hampered their outfield depth, they didn’t get a better replacement at the position, and they missed out on any return they could have gotten for Schwarber. Yes, Pederson makes their team better, but it only makes them just as good as they would have been if they had just kept Schwarber. Perhaps there’s more at play here that we cannot see behind the curtain of the front office, but so far, this is not a promising start for Jed Hoyer’s administration.